The end of the world as we know it : public ethics in times of de-standardization and individualization by Demmke, Christoph et al.
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rpxm20
Public Management Review
ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rpxm20
The end of the world as we know it – public
ethics in times of de-standardization and
individualization
Christoph Demmke, Jari Autioniemi & Florian Lenner
To cite this article: Christoph Demmke, Jari Autioniemi & Florian Lenner (2021): The end of the
world as we know it – public ethics in times of de-standardization and individualization, Public
Management Review, DOI: 10.1080/14719037.2021.2000221
To link to this article:  https://doi.org/10.1080/14719037.2021.2000221
© 2021 The Author(s). Published by Informa
UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis
Group.
Published online: 09 Nov 2021.
Submit your article to this journal 
Article views: 140
View related articles 
View Crossmark data
The end of the world as we know it – public ethics in 
times of de-standardization and individualization
Christoph Demmkea, Jari Autioniemia and Florian Lennerb
aDepartment of Public Management, University of Vaasa, Vaasa, Finland; bDepartment of Political 
Sciences, University of Munich, Munich, Germany
Abstract
Current governance and managerial trends emphasize context-oriented and best- 
fit approaches, de-standardization and the role of individual discretion in deci-
sion-making. We discuss the results of a European-wide study on the effective-
ness of Conflict of Interest (CoI) policies for Ministers in a de-standardized 
context. Our results show trends towards individualized and sophisticated policies 
and approaches in the field of CoI. Policies are also becoming more bureaucratic 
and complex. The implementation of these policies tends to suffer from short-
comings. These shortcomings generate doubts as to whether ethics policies have 
become more effective.
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Introduction
Over the past decade, public management in Europe has constantly evolved. An ever- 
increasing body of rules and codes has made the management of ethical violations 
more complex and sophisticated. In almost all countries, traditional hierarchical, 
bureaucratic and standardized public administration systems have changed into new 
more individualized, de-standardized and fragmented models of public administra-
tion. These de-bureaucratization trends have not lead to less formalism or fewer 
administrative burdens. In fact, it is far from evident whether the new trends have 
been effective.
The purpose of this article is to discuss the relationship between de- 
standardization trends in the field of public management and their impact on 
the effectiveness of ethics policies in preventing and managing ethics violations 
and increasing trust in public office. We take the case of Conflict of Interest (CoI) 
policies as a particular example. De-standardization is defined as increasing 
variability and decreasing uniformity of public management practices and respon-
sibilities (Demmke 2020). We argue that current de-standardization and indivi-
dualization trends generate the emergence of a new ethics bureaucracy and 
produce ever new shortcomings in the implementation of ethics policies. Ethics 
policies do not per se become more effective.
CONTACT Jari Autioniemi jari.autioniemi@uva.fi
PUBLIC MANAGEMENT REVIEW                         
https://doi.org/10.1080/14719037.2021.2000221
© 2021 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.  
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 
License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and repro-
duction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way.
Anti-corruption efforts in democratic states ‘have been unimpressive’ (Johnson and 
Fritzen 2021, 6). Current research in the field of public service ethics even concludes 
that corruption is on the rise (Mungiu-Pippidi 2020) and the fight against corruption is 
not successful (Johnson and Fritzen 2021). In addition, national public management 
reforms differ and outcomes of reforms are very context-specific, especially in central 
and eastern European countries (Mazur 2020). The interaction between the public and 
the private sector, the political and the administrative level and between Ministers, 
advisers, and civil servants is constantly changing and becoming more complex. 
Consequently, claims are being made of trends towards more politization, conflicts 
of interest and corruption (Hustedt and Houlberg-Salomonsen 2017; Halligan 2021). 
‘Globally, the demand for management and policy consulting expertise from govern-
ments, public sector organizations and transnational agencies has grown steadily since 
the early 1990s’ (Sturdy et al. 2020). For some years, a shift has been taking place from 
a stable and institutionalized policy advisory system to a more politicized, pluralized, 
flexible and ad hoc policy advisory system (Van Den Berg 2017). In addition, there is 
a large group of private, commercial advising and consulting agencies (the so-called 
‘invisible public sector’) that advise the government (based on their strategic interests).
In many countries, trends are towards a decline in trust, democracy, justice, 
transparency and rule of law. These trends cannot be limited to the so-called illiberal 
democracies (Schäfer and Zürn 2021, 50).
Looking into the relationship between public management reform and ethics is 
a daunting task. Given the current state of ‘democratic backsliding’ in many countries, 
one might expect more interest in the link between governance trends, HRM reforms 
and outcomes in the field of public ethics, too (Bauer 2021). Bringing awareness into 
this link is even more important given the recent trends in Human Resource 
Management (HRM) towards more de-standardized and individualized HR 
approaches.
When linking public management with ethics, in the past, experts focused their 
attention on the relationship between bureaucracy and corruption (Rauch and Evans 
2000; Dahlström, Lapuente, and Teorell 2012; Dahlstöm and Lapuente 2017) or the 
effects of (new) public management reforms on ethics (Frederickson 1996, 1997, 1999; 
Kolthoff 2007; Maesschalck 2004; Rauh 2018).
In the meantime, reforms in both, public management and in the field of public 
service ethics have grown in complexity and are not the preserve of legal and political 
science scholars anymore. Instead, these issues are dealt with in governance theories, 
management science, organizational theory, behavioural economy, leadership theory, 
organizational justice, motivation theory, social cognitive theory, moral development 
theory, philosophy, organizational behaviour, law, artificial intelligence, digitalization 
and identity politics.
Also, our case study of CoI illustrates a growing complexity of ethics policies. 
Originally, CoI used to be a legal concept that (exclusively) applied to professional 
activities. As a matter of legal doctrine, a CoI arises only when interests, activities, 
decisions, or relationships compromise the loyalty or independent judgement of civil 
servants, or holders of public office. CoI arise in public sector ‘when a public official has 
private-capacity interests which could improperly influence the performance of their 
official duties and responsibilities’ (OECD 2003). Today, CoI can be treated as 
a borderline concept between law, politics, economy, sociology, organizational beha-
viour, behavioural sciences, (conflicting) value management and morality, which raises 
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questions on whether law and traditional compliance-based approaches can be effec-
tive in fighting against CoI. Defining CoI is getting more difficult since the concept can 
be understood as an umbrella term containing tensions between different roles and 
functions. Nowadays, countries manage CoI in a very de-standardized and individua-
lized context. Different CoI rules, policies and management practices apply for differ-
ent government levels, institutions and different holders of public office.
The interest in the link between de-standardization and ethics has not kept pace 
with the growth of interest in the other fields of public management and public service 
ethics. The era in which obedience, hierarchical decision making, and treating every-
one the same way was considered sufficient to treat everybody fairly no longer holds 
(Ben-Sharar and Porat 2021). The age of standardization was well suited for the belief 
in and practice that equal treatment for all is fair treatment. However, modern 
organizations along with ethnic, racial, gender, and age diversity have challenged 
elected officials and administrators around the world to rethink how to treat people 
differently and yet to be fair (Menzel 2011, 122).
Consequently, not only diversity and identity politics have become popular, but also 
the personalization of law (Ben-Sharar and Porat 2021) and de-standardized manage-
ment practices. Therefore, a new challenge is to design effective systems under 
decentralized and individualized conditions that combine the efficiency and service 
capacity of decentralized organizations with the uniform and legalistic nature of 
hierarchical organizations (Peters and Pierre 2003, 6). Decentralization, delegation, 
and autonomy have been key features of public management reforms for decades. The 
belief, often drawn from the literature on management in the private sector, was that 
giving managers greater autonomy would lead to the more effective accomplishment of 
the desired outcomes, to improvements in productivity, and to a sharper focus on 
targets, employee and organizational performance (Coggburn 2005). It is not surpris-
ing that reformers advocated a ‘let managers manage’ approach, the dominant assump-
tion being that managers will know the right thing to do.
Until today, there is little to no research on the effectiveness of ethics policies in 
a de-standardized and individualized setting. Will ethics policies become more effec-
tive? Or vice versa: Could it be that de-standardized ethics policies lead back to more 
(ethics) bureaucracy?
In the literature, the link between new public management reforms, ethics and CoI 
was often seen as critical, because of a too strong focus on managerial and economical 
values, instead of public values (Andersson and Anechiarico 2014). As a result, these 
trends downplay the importance of other values and principles such as quality, fair-
ness, equality, and impartiality.
Experts have been equally critical of the connection between bureaucracy and 
ethics. Linking the two issues is still highly relevant. No country worldwide has 
completely abolished all bureaucratic features, as defined by Weber (Demmke 2020). 
Moreover, no government has privatized the delivery of all public tasks, no public 
administration (today) works as a private company, and no public institutional system 
entirely emulates private sector practices. Therefore, in all countries worldwide, despite 
ongoing reforms, government institutional frameworks are still perceived as being 
different compared to those applied in the private sector.
In their seminal study, Dahlström and Lapuente (2017) concluded that countries 
with classical (bureaucratic) governance systems (closed Weberian structures) do not 
perform well in three indicators of the quality of government: corruption, government 
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effectiveness, and, as a proxy for administrative reforms, the prevalence of perfor-
mance-related pay in the public sector. For a measure of closed Weberianness, the 
authors rely on data from the Quality of Government Expert Survey (Dahlström, 
Dahlberg, and Teorell 2012). They use several items related to the recruitment of 
officials, the existence of a career structure, and the existence of specific employment 
laws (Dahlström and Lapuente 2017, 49). In employment features, one indicator 
measures the existence of lifelong careers, and the other the ‘protection mechanism’. 
The latter indicates whether it is common that public employees are protected by 
specific employment laws.
Findings suggest that more regulated, inflexible, and closed systems do not perform 
as well as more open, post-bureaucratic, and managerial systems (Dahlström and 
Lapuente 2017, 37, 38). These findings coincide with past popular managerial trends 
that emphasize the need for de-bureaucratization, flexible forms of governance, open-
ness, de-standardization, the role of individual discretion in decision-making, and 
organizational structures and processes that differ from formerly standardized and 
rigid administrative patterns.
Most importantly, the authors note that there is no significant correlation between 
closed Weberian bureaucracy and corruption. According to the authors, neither 
lifelong careers in the public sector nor the enjoyment of special employment 
privileges seems to make the public administration of a country less corrupt 
(Dahlström and Lapuente 2017, 68). Moreover, the protection of the bureaucracy 
through specific employment laws and the provision of lifelong careers does not 
correlate with government effectiveness (Dahlström and Lapuente 2017, 68). 
Mungiu-Pippidi (2020) confirms the above-mentioned results that countries with 
more hierarchical decision-making structures and a higher power distance index in 
organizations (Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov 2010) have higher levels of 
corruption.
The difficulty with this type of analysis lies in its simplicity, its state-centred 
approach, a focus on traditional administrative typologies thinking and the assump-
tion that countries can be compared based on a limited number of selected indicators. 
Another problem is the assumption that closed, rigid and standardized (Weberian) 
administrative models still exist. We claim that – in the meantime – also formerly 
closed Weberian systems have integrated many de-standardized and ‘open’ features 
(e.g. in the field of public employment, pension policies, pay systems, working time, job 
security, recruitment policies and training policies) and have developed towards 
hybrid systems. Most importantly, in all countries worldwide, governance, organiza-
tional and HR-reforms have led to more differentiation, de-standardization and 
individualization. While introducing new governance and administrative innovations, 
countries have based these on their own cultural, economical, technological, social, 
institutional and linguistic foundations instead of copying former universal or inter-
national models.
Overall, current organizational reforms also vary from policy to policy and are 
influenced by various HR strategies and work systems. Standardized governance and 
organizational types, like closed Weberian models, are unlikely to be found in the real 
world. Different public policies are managed within different organizational cultures. 
Each form of work organization tends to be associated with particular work systems, 
work styles, and is different amongst sectors and occupational categories (Arundel 
et al. 2007).
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In our paper, we are interested in understanding better the link between individua-
lized, de-standardized and flexible public management models and ethics policies. 
How did the discussed trends impact ethics policies? As we will argue, whereas new 
forms of governance have become more de-standardized, ethics policies have become 
more bureaucratic, professionalized, institutionalized, complex and cost intensive. 
This altogether presents a highly contradictory scenario with very uncertain effects 
in the field of ethics. It is therefore an intriguing question whether trends towards new 
de-standardized modes of governance have contributed to more or less effective ethics 
policies?
Linking organizational typologies with ethics
The organizational theory claims that organizational settings influence people´s way of 
thinking and their behaviour, and hence the content of public policy. Therefore, an 
organizational theory approach of integrity policies assumes that it is impossible to 
understand integrity policies without the way public institutions work and without 
analysing how they are organized and their modes of working. Accordingly, institu-
tional integrity can be defined as a quality of institutions that is supposed to promote 
the quality of public employees (Kirby 2020).
For a long time, in the field of public management and also in the field of public 
service ethics, there was little interest in the discussion about the effects of institutional 
design, public management reforms and ethics policies. One explanation for this is that 
ethics policies were largely input-driven, which means that politicians focused on the 
adoption of ever more rules and codes, but much less on investments in the effective 
implementation and enforcement of policies. In the 1980s, Transparency International 
was the first body to promote the concept of ethics infrastructures and ethics regimes. 
This was a reaction to the existing ‘implementation gap’ in the field. Following this, the 
OECD started to adopt toolboxes, guidelines, and practical manuals for decision- 
makers and public officials (Maesschalck and Bertok 2008; latest OECD 2020). 
Moreover, the demands for better ‘Ethical Leadership’ and the institutionalization of 
integrity policies became popular. As long ago as 2000, Paine published Does Ethics 
Pay? and discussed the added value of ethics management such as the positive link 
between ethics and organizational performance (Paine 2000).
Still, until today, experts disagree about the best way to institutionalize ethics 
policies. One reason for this is the fragmented nature of approaches and because ethics 
systems differ widely from rigid compliance-based to ‘soft’ value-based systems, with, 
both, strengths and weaknesses. Moreover, academic publications about institutiona-
lization are rare. According to Breaky, Cadman, and Sampford (2015), Sampford was 
the first academic to distinguish between institutional and individual integrity (see also 
Kirby (2020). Since then, Hoekstra and Kaptein became leading experts in the field of 
institutionalizing (public service) ethics (Hoekstra and Kaptein 2012; Kaptein 1998; 
Hoekstra and Zweegers 2021; Hoekstra et al. 2021). Also related to the issue of 
institutional integrity, Cropanzano and Folger (1991) were the first to use the term 
of organizational justice. Next, Treviño (1986) used the concepts of unethical beha-
viour in the workplace and ethical culture. In the private sector, the concept of 
managerial ethics was founded by Schminke (1998). The notion of integrity systems 
seems to originate in the works by Jeremy Pope (1996), the founder of Transparency 
International.
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Finally, according to the OECD, the concept of integrity management can be 
defined as the activities undertaken to stimulate and enforce integrity and prevent 
corruption and other integrity violations within a particular organization. Integrity 
management is the sum of systematic and integrated efforts to promote integrity 
within public-sector organizations. Integrity management requires an integrated, 
systematic and coherent approach. Integrity instruments and initiatives are more 
effective when they are part of a systematic style. Although the importance of such 
a concerted approach seems almost a matter of course, this is not yet the case in many 
public organizations. Second, integrity management suffers from implementation 
deficiencies. Methodologically, there is no consensus about the right organizational 
design; which HRM practices and instruments constitute a theoretically complete set 
of ethics policies; the definition of ethical performance and; how ethics and ethical 
leadership are to be measured. Theoretically, there is no consensus of the mechanism 
by which ethics might impact outcomes.
In the field of organizational theory, sound empirical knowledge exists only on the 
positive link between meritocratic structures and lower levels of corruption and 
politization (Meyer-Sahling, Mikkelsen, and Schuster 2018). The interest in the link 
between HRM and ethics has not kept pace with the increase of interest in business 
ethics (Greenwood 2013). This is interesting because ethical challenges abound in 
HRM. Each day, HR managers and leaders ‘change, shape, redirect and fundamentally 
alter the course of other people’s lives’ (Margolis, Grant, and Molinsky 2007, 237). 
Failures and successes in managing individual discretion have an important impact on 
workplace behaviour, fairness perception, job engagement, and performance. The 
same challenges concern the issue of accountability (Bovens 2010; Bovens, 
Schillemans, and Hart 2008; Bovens, Schillemans, and Goodin 2014; Jackson 2009).
In the field of HRM, after periods of decentralization and ‘letting managers man-
age’, awareness is growing that too much diversity, best-fit, context, contingency, 
nominalism, bounded rationality and individualism are possibly not the right remedies 
to resolve ethical problems. Awareness is growing that ethical problems increase 
because of a parallel decline of universal standards and basic moral principles. In 
international politics, moral relativism is gaining in importance. However, these trends 
also deprive people of moral confidence, of the sense that we are right to condemn the 
actions of wrongdoers, and relativism removes the sense of conflict between apparently 
conflicting moral judgements that since they are relative, they do not conflict, or the 
conflicts do not matter (Lukes 2008).
The growing importance of individuals in public management studies conforms with 
the growing popularity of behavioural insights and an emerging ‘affective revolution’ in 
public management, micropolitics (Burns 1961) in organizational theory, and individua-
lization concepts or ‘Singularisierung’ (Reckwitz 2017) in sociology. Diversity and 
identity politics have also become popular in political sciences. According to 
Fukuyama (2018), universal concepts are being challenged by the rise of identity politics 
(Fukuyama 2018, xvi). In international politics, Laing (2020) claims we have entered the 
era of a post-homogenous, diverse and individualized society. In the field of organiza-
tional justice, experts discuss whether new justice concepts should be made more 
sensitive to individual responsibility (Knight and Stemplowska 2011; Mounk 2017, 30).
There is nothing wrong with hiring, rewarding and sanctioning people based on 
individual merit and responsibility. It is an appealing idea. However, it also encourages 
people to think of themselves as responsible for their fate. ‘The more we view ourselves 
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as self-made and self-sufficient, the less likely we are to care for the fate of those less 
fortunate than ourselves’ (Sandel 2020, 59). The principle of meritocracy is increas-
ingly self-defeating as it both supports growing individualism and inequality instead of 
public value thinking.
Another development rapidly entering HRM is the monitoring and surveillance of 
workplace behaviour and the growing attention to individual neuropsychological 
dimensions of behaviour such as activities, individual attention and perception, 
emotions and motives for stress, and many other concrete factors influencing 
productivity and worker feelings (Carpintero 2017). Finally, in the field of corporate 
social responsibility (CSR), there has been a rapid increase in the literature on 
individual-level research, now popularly called micro-CSR (Glavas and Radic 
2019). This literature provides insights into how corporate social practices are 
influenced by the behaviour of their organizational members. These examples illus-
trate an increased interest in individuals and emotions. According to Davies (Davies 
2019), we are entering a new era in which generalization and assumptions that there 
are laws, principles and values governing society as a whole and history as a whole, 
disappear (Davies 2019, 162).
One may also sum up these trends by claiming that the discipline of ‘people’ is 
gaining importance within the field of Public Management (Boselie, Van Harten, 
and Veld 2019), especially concerning motives for individual behaviour (Godard 
2014; Budds 2019). Together with a more macro-perspective, this trend has led to 
organizational structures and public sector systems that combine formerly 
Taylorism, rule-bound, and traditional bureaucratic models with elements of flex-
ible, innovative, and high-performance work systems. As a result, also increasingly, 
employment status and working conditions vary for different types of employees in 
the field of working time, pay, recruitment policies, performance assessment, 
performance management, training, competency management, career develop-
ment- and retirement policies. All these developments create a new diversity of 
administrative systems that do not match anymore with classical administrative 
typologies.
The emergence of these new systems also creates new ethical opportunities, but 
also new fairness and justice challenges (Demmke 2020). For example, a study by 
Bezes and Jeannot (2018) notes that in some fields of HRM, line managers have 
considerable autonomy in taking HR decisions. Increasingly, managers change, 
shape, direct, and alter the employee’s lives. Managers make hiring decisions; assess 
competencies, skills, and performance; decide on training needs, rewards, sanctions, 
promotions, telework opportunities, diversity issues, dismissals, and private-work 
balance; provide feedback; etc. All these tasks have important ethical consequences 
for individuals, especially if managers do not have the necessary skills on how to 
manage fairly and in professional ways new tasks and responsibilities (Meyer and 
Hammerschmid 2010).
Ben-Sharar and Porat (2021, 9) discuss the ethical implications that result from 
trends towards the personalization of law. ‘Personalized law is alarming because it 
threatens a fundamental principle of liberalism: equality under the law’ (Ben-Sharar 
and Porat 2021, 9). Together with the above-mentioned de-standardization and indi-
vidualization trends, they generate a new set of ethical challenges for a public manage-
ment world in which people are different and the laws that govern them are 
personalized.
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Behaviouralism as a counter-trend to the past
The above-mentioned trends may not only be of general interest to organizational 
and HRM experts. Instead, they illustrate similar trends in other disciplines like 
governance theory, management, and public service ethics. In all of these fields, 
present approaches can also be interpreted as counter-trends to the past. Such 
counter-trends are moving from rationality to bounded rationality (Brooke, 
McGee, and Jones 2019), from hierarchical steering to individual discretion and 
job autonomy, from standardization to de-standardization, from centralized con-
cepts of fairness to individualized concepts of fairness, from ethical decision- 
making to bounded ethicality, and from people´s moral development (Kohlberg) 
to individual moral identity concepts. In the field of public service ethics, beha-
vioural economics and behavioural ethics (Bazerman and Tenbrunsel 2011; 
Bazerman and Chugh 2015; Tenbrunsel and Chugh 2015; OECD 2018) are viewed 
as important and increasingly inform decision-makers and policymaking. For 
example, classical instruments that are based on law and compliance-based 
approaches are believed to be ineffective since they guard only against intentional 
forms of unethical behaviour (and not unintentional forms). Instead, today´s 
discourses focus on partiality, bounded awareness (Bazerman and Sezer 2016) 
and value-based approaches and purpose-driven management. According to the 
OECD (2018), behavioural sciences are thought of as improving integrity in 
different ways. Consequently, the ‘bad apple’ or ‘focus on the person as a root 
cause, is making a reappearance’ (Tenbrunsel and Chugh 2015, 207). As 
a consequence, the reform of integrity management also develops into an indivi-
dualized, specialized and sophisticated approach (Stark 2000) and is being com-
bined with ever-stricter behavioural requirements.
The effects of de-standardization and individualization – the case of conflicts of 
interest policies in the EU member states
This case study about the effectiveness of CoI policies is based on data generated 
from a comparative study (European Parliament 2020) in the field of CoI, which 
was generated by the authors and commissioned by the European Parliament in 
2020. The purpose of the research was to gain an overview of the existing rules 
and policies of different CoI, as well as countries’ evaluations of the effectiveness 
of these policies. In the study, a European-wide survey was conducted under the 
umbrella of the European Presidency (and, more precisely, in co-operation with 
the European Public Administration Network, EUPAN, during the year 2020, 
which is composed of top officials from all EU Member States). By following 
a similar method used in an earlier comparative study (European Commission 
2008), the 2020 study applied for the first time a longitudinal approach and 
measured the development of CoI policies over time. So far, the few existing 
comparative studies in the field of CoI used qualitative methods (Peters and 
Handschin. 2012; Auby, Breen, and Perroud 2014)
The study operationalized CoI using a list of 15 different Conflicts of Interests, such 
as a declaration of financial interests and assets, HPO’s spouse’s activities and provi-
sions relating to the declaration of interests.
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Ultimately, 17 countries participated in the survey
To prevent the answers from being personally biased, the survey was not sent to the 
individual Ministers/Secretaries, but to the administrations that are responsible for the 
overall management of the governments integrity policies. In most countries, the 
delivered data was discussed internally and coordinated with several individuals, anti- 
corruption agencies, and ministries.
To operationalize and measure the existing policies and instruments in the Member 
States, we introduced the term ‘policy coverage density’. In our analysis, this refers to 
the percentage of CoI issues covered by laws or codes. If a Member State regulates/ 
manages all CoI issues, the country has a policy coverage density of 100%. The data 
gained from the survey was subsequently analysed with data from different surveys 
such as Eurobarometer, Gallup trust polls, Transparency International corruption 
indices or Quality of Government data from the University of Gothenburg to examine 
inter alia the relationship between the policy coverage density, trust, tolerance of 
corruption, etc. We are well aware of the ongoing discussion about the accuracy of 
some indices. To avoid the pitfalls of interpreting too much into single scores, we tried 
to operationalize and measure concepts like trust or the quality of governance using 
different indicators and comparing the results. For instance, we have measured 
democracy using the index by the Economist Intelligence Unit and the Bertelsmann 
Foundation, leading to nearly identical results. The same goes for trust, as this is 
particularly hard to measure. We have supplemented the Gallup trust index with 
various questions from the Eurobarometer survey, targeting trust from different 
angles. While the Gallup index would have suggested that higher policy coverage 
density, as a consequence of de-standardization and individualization, has indeed led 
to slightly higher trust levels, the results comparing different measurements of trust are 
much more inconclusive. More on this later. Whereas this does not eliminate all the 
shortcomings some of these indices might have, it certainly allows us to draw much 
more informed conclusions.
The EU member states presented a perfect example for the case study for multiple 
reasons. It allowed us to carry out the first-ever longitudinal analysis of CoI policies, 
based on a similar study one of the authors conducted for the European Commission 
in 2007, also focusing on the EU member states. Secondly, the longitudinal approach 
allowed for conclusions about the effectiveness of efforts over time. Thirdly, the topic 
of conflicts of interest policies represents an interesting example for the study of de- 
standardized and individualized management practices. CoI policies are based on the 
‘bad person model’ of integrity. They are almost exclusively interested in preventing 
conflicts of interests arising from individual basis or intrapersonal relations. Very little 
attention is paid to systemic or organizational causes.
The trend towards the adoption of more laws, codes, policies, the widening of 
definitions and the setting of stricter requirements requires ever more complex and 
sophisticated monitoring interventions. For example, the HR department in the 
European Commission performs approximately 3000 revolving door checks per year 
of those individuals who are being recruited, or who leave the organization (European 
Ombudsman 2017). Thus, Member States are confronted with an entirely new chal-
lenge: Increasing policy and disclosure requirements and the monitoring of revolving 
door cases generates an ethics bureaucracy and requires new investments in personnel 
resources, new institutional structures and the better monitoring of policies. Thus, 
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paradoxically (Nieuwenburg 2007), while national public management reforms con-
tinue to move away from classical bureaucratic features, trends in the field of public 
service ethics lead to the emergence of a new ethics bureaucracy.
Legal and administrative fragmentation in the field of conflicts of interest
We found in our survey that, overall, the regulation of CoI in the Member States of the 
EU is extremely fragmented on the national, regional and local levels, amongst 
different public institutions and different holders of public office. The same concerns 
the management of CoI. In most countries, oversight and control are the responsibility 
of many bodies and actors.
In most cases, responsibilities are shared amongst various actors:
● Court of Auditors with responsibilities for auditing ethics policies.
● Ombud Officers with responsibilities for managing maladministration.
● HR departments with ethical responsibilities for recruitment and disclosure 
policies.
● Integrity Officers, Ethics Commissioners, or Presidents with various advisory and 
supervisory functions.
● Decentralized ethics committees/Centralized Ethics Committees with various 
responsibilities for one or several institutions.
● Specific Recruitment and Appointment Bodies with responsibilities for avoiding 
CoI in the process.
● Specific Revolving-Door Bodies.
● Courts with legal and disciplinary control and sanction responsibilities.
According to the survey results, the EU Member States regard the issue of the revolving 
door as the greatest challenge in managing CoI. Revolving door policies focus on 
individual conflicts of interest when switching between the public and the private 
sector.
In our study, we also asked countries about the most pertinent challenges in the field 
of CoI and suggested a list of six obstacles to the effective implementation of CoI. 
Interestingly, when looking at the policy coverage density in the EU member states, it 
appears that mainly the countries with higher levels of policy coverage density admit 
facing challenges. Although this does not suggest that countries with lower levels of 
policy coverage density perform better, it does indicate that ever more regulation 
certainly does not lead automatically to more effectiveness. In their responses to the 
survey, most countries complained about increasing administrative burdens, ‘red tape’ 
and a lack of skilled personnel that can manage individual revolving door cases 
effectively.
De-standardization in the EU member states
Concerning the longitudinal analysis, the results show that every CoI issue has a higher 
policy coverage density than a decade ago. Nearly every country has more rules and 
policies in place today than in 2007. Amongst the 15 analysed CoI policies, every CoI 
issue has a higher policy coverage density than a decade ago. We also note processes of 
expanding (definitions and issues) and deepening the concept of CoI. For example, 
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countries continue to expand the concept of revolving door. Moreover, countries 
include ever more financial and non-financial issues that are being defined as (poten-
tial) CoI. The latter findings are important, because of the difficulties involved in 
managing and enforcing non-financial forms of CoI (like loyalty conflicts arising from 
cases of national affinity, political affinity, friendships, family relationships, party 
affiliations, associations, religious beliefs, emotional life or other factors that could 
compromise the impartiality and objectivity of a person). They can also result from 
involvement with non-governmental or political organizations (even if non remuner-
ated) or competing duties of loyalty between one entity the person owes a duty to and 
another person or entity.
Non-financial CoI and CoI arising from personal friendships and family relation-
ships are the most difficult issues to monitor and enforce. For example, whereas in the 
past the concept of spouse exclusively applied (if at all!) to the husband or the wife, the 
concepts of immediate family or spouse are constantly evolving (especially from 
a comparative point of view). The European Commission takes the view that 
‘“immediate family” should comprise, at least, the following relationships (. . .): The 
spouse (including a partner with whom the individual has a (non-) registered non- 
marital partnership), children and parents, (great-)grandparents and (great-)grand-
children, (half-) brothers and sisters (including from blended families), uncles and 
aunts, nieces and nephews, first-degree cousins, parents-in-law, children-in-law, sib-
lings-in-law, stepparents and stepchildren’ (European Commission, OJ, C 121/1 of 
9 April 2021, 8 and 9).
Thus, apart from the concept of ‘immediate family’, also the changing concepts of 
close friendships, extended family, etc. lead to ever-changing forms of potential con-
flict of interests and pose a huge challenge in the monitoring process.
As regards the effects of de-standardization and individualization trends in the field 
of CoI, we expected an increasing policy coverage density per country and per CoI 
issue, the widening of CoI definitions to cover more non-financial CoI definitions and 
an extension on the applicability of CoI to cover more personal and potential CoI 
aspects (such as the need for spouses of Ministers to also disclose their CoI).
Our data confirmed that nearly every country regulates more CoI issues today than 
it did in 2007 (and some countries cover even 100% of all suggested types of 15 CoI in 
the survey). In addition, Figure 2 also shows that for every single CoI issue, the 
percentage of member states regulating this issue has also increased since 2007. This 
is especially noteworthy as this figure itself displays the trend towards de- 
standardization and individualization. Take for example the issue of ‘Holders of 
Public Office (HPO) spouse´s activities’. Today, more countries require that also the 
spouses and immediate family members of ministers and top-officials must declare 
their financial and non-financial interests. Thus, the expansion of CoI policies develops 
in parallel with a deepening and individualization of disclosure requirements. Figures 1 
and 2 confirm our claim that the regulation of CoI rules and policies in the EU member 
states requires – in fact – the implementation and monitoring of ever more de- 
standardized and individualized cases. This has further implications for the interpreta-
tion of our data on the effectiveness of CoI policies that we will address in the following 
chapter.
In almost all countries (except for the Netherlands), the law is still the predominant 
means of managing CoI. However, in all countries, there is growing insecurity about 
the right regulatory mix, the role of self-regulation, the effectiveness of deterrence 
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mechanisms and sanctions, the quality of regulation and the need for other political, 
behavioural and economical instruments. Overall, the management of Conflict of 
Interest also requires better administrative cooperation and enhanced interdisciplinary 
cooperation because it is a borderline concept at the intersection of law, politics, 
economy, sociology, organizational behaviour and morality. Again, this raises the 
question of the limits of legalistic and traditional compliance-based approaches. 
However, while adopting ever new rules, codes and standards, countries have not yet 
started to question the ineffectiveness of their approaches.
According to the study, the EU Member States are doing too much and too little at 
the same time. Evaluating the effectiveness of CoI policies is facing many obstacles. The 
term effectiveness is not only about measuring policies with regards to a balanced ratio 
between input, output and outcomes, because it is also concerned with offering better 
solutions and reaching governance objectives and standards. As data on the develop-
ment of CoI is not available, assessing the effectiveness of ever more and ever stricter 
policies is naturally a difficult task. We also agree that ethics policies have rarely just 
positive effects (Hesse, Hood, and Peter. 2003) but also negative and positive, neutral 
and negative (unintentional) side-effects, including bureaucracy, higher costs, moral 
intrusion into privacy and moral instruments for political purposes. Many variables 
affect the effectiveness of ethics policies, such as good working conditions, ethical 
leadership and perceptions of organizational fairness. Therefore, our study highlights 
the urgency for the EU Member States to generate data in the field of CoI, since the lack 
of data makes any research difficult and somehow a subject of speculation.
This also concerns the two most important objectives of CoI policies. CoI policies 
should prevent and reduce CoI, and CoI policies should contribute to generating more 
trust in holders of public office. According to the results, the question of whether these 
objectives have been achieved is questionable. Like corruption in general, CoI is 
notoriously difficult to measure, and because of this, there is little to no evidence on 
whether CoI and corruption are increasing or decreasing (Heywood 2014).
The study revealed that Government Integrity is higher in countries with lower 
levels of policy coverage density and that countries with better safeguards to prevent 
corruption have on average higher Government Integrity. There, it can be said that 
adopting more rules and policies is not enough – instead, it is important to invest in 
high-quality integrity policies and good governance policies as well as implementing 
them properly. While these findings are not new, it is important to note the empirical 
confirmation that effective integrity policies pay off in terms of satisfaction with the 
functioning of the democratic system.
More rules and standards can produce an outcome in which more rules and 
standards can be violated, which can decrease public trust in public office. Therefore, 
most ethics experts think that more rules might not automatically increase more trust. 
According to Auby, Breen, and Perroud (2014), ‘the level of public trust in govern-
ment . . . impacts the choice of legislation’. To summarize, the data does not suggest 
a negative effect of higher policy coverage density on trust, but neither a positive effect.
Ever more policies, ever less effectiveness?
While the effectiveness of ethics policies is inherently hard to measure, in the case of 
CoI, it is even harder because the EU member states do not collect data on the 
development of CoI issues. However, our evidence allows for some conclusions, 
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tracing the ineffectiveness back to the ongoing process of de-standardization. 
Therefore, in the following, we focus on two main objectives of CoI policies: prevent-
ing and managing CoI as well as increasing trust in public officials.
Policy ineffectiveness in times of ethics bureaucratization – tracing the effects of 
de-standardization
In our survey, we asked member states what they perceive as most pertinent CoI 
challenges.
Results indicate that countries perceive revolving doors, post-employment, grey 
zones and high complexity of the issues as the greatest challenges in managing CoI, 
with eight to seven confirmations. Right after these challenges, political reluctance to 
sanction was confirmed by six countries. High tolerance for CoI of ministers and 
trends towards politization got the least number of confirmations. The low number of 
confirmations about politization trends is somewhat surprising since trends in public 
administration are in fact towards politization. The reason for such a low number 
could be that the countries see the issue of politization trends as somewhat general and 
vague and find it difficult to give a straight answer to a very fuzzy issue.
According to our data, it appears that mainly countries with higher policy coverage 
density admit to facing challenges and having weaknesses in their CoI management, 
except for Austria, Latvia and Sweden. Of course, this does not suggest that de- 
regulating leads to better performances, but it certainly questions the assumption 
that ever more rules lead to more effectiveness in CoI management.
This particularly applies to cases of revolving door, post-employment, the political 
reluctance to sanction ethical violations and the high complexity of the issues at hand. 
This is another indication of one of the unintended side-effects of de-standardization 
and individualization. Apparently, in countries with high policy coverage density, and 
consequently a multitude of rules to implement and follow through on, governments 
see the high complexity of the issues as one of the key problems in managing CoI. 
Again, this does not imply that countries with lower levels of policy coverage density 
do not face these issues, they simply didn’t indicate so in our survey.
Another conclusion to draw from this is that higher policy coverage density 
seemingly does not satisfy the expectations policymaker had in terms of preventing 
and managing CoI cases. While not only the number of rules in place but also the 
number of countries regulating post-employment increased considerably since 2007, 
revolving-door and post-employment issues continue to be an important challenge for 
these governments. The goal of preventing and managing CoI was, in conclusion, not 
achieved through ever more legislation.
Lastly, the fact that many countries with high policy coverage density indicated 
political reluctance to sanction ethical breaches is a clear indication of another point to 
consider. The effectiveness of more legislation does not derive simply from more 
legislation being in place. It is also about loopholes, the applicability of a certain policy, 
the determination by governments to actually apply these rules, the growing complex-
ity of rules and policies and the need for constant capacity-building to effectively 
implement CoI policies.
How does this link to de-standardization? As we have shown in the previous chapter, 
not only do nearly all participating member states regulate more than in 2007. For every 
single CoI issue presented in Figure 2, the percentage of member states to regulate the 
issue has increased. This list of 15 CoI issues in Table 1, 2 is, in itself, as mentioned 
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earlier, a depiction of trends towards de-standardization, individualization and widen-
ing of CoI concepts to include also ever more non-pecuniary issues. High policy 
coverage density is a clear indicator of de-standardization. Amongst the countries 
with high policy coverage density who admitted that they face difficulties in the 
implementation of CoI policies, Austria regulates 80% of all CoI issues, Bulgaria 
regulates 90%, Portugal 93% and the Czech Republic, Hungary, Luxembourg, 
Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia regulate 100% of all CoI issues. We interpret this as 
a confirmation that trends of high policy density are related to significant shortcomings 
in the implementation and management of CoI. While correlation, of course, does not 
imply causation, these results indicate a possibly fruitful and important research avenue 
for the future.
However, our data suggest these conclusions also in other areas. While corruption is 
arguably not the same as CoI, underperformance on corruption prevention can be 
used as a proxy to conclude about the general approach towards ethical misconduct. 
Our data show that countries with higher levels of policy coverage density generally 
score worse on the Transparency International Corruption Index. Additionally, these 
countries also score low on the Freedom House Index, measuring the effectiveness of 
corruption prevention. This has important implications for the assessment of effec-
tiveness. It allows for the conclusion that simply regulating more does not lead to better 
Table 1. List of potential CoI.
1) Declaration of financial interests 
and assets
11) Rules on receptions and representations
2) HPO’s spouse’s activities 12) Accepting gifts, decorations and distinctions
3) Provisions relating to the 
declaration of interests
13) General rules on impartiality and conflicts of interest
4) Outside activities: Political 
activities
14) Specific rules on incompatibility of posts and professional activities 
before or during the term of office
5) Outside activities: Honorary 
positions
15) Restrictions on professional commitments or holding other posts 
after leaving office
6) Outside activities: Conferences




Table 2. Countries confirming challenges as the greatest in managing CoI.
Challenge Countries
Revolving doors Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Luxembourg, Portugal, Romania, 
Slovenia
Post-employment Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Hungary, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Sweden
Lack of monitoring experts Austria, Czech Republic, Portugal
Lack of financial resources Austria, Czech Republic, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia
Political reluctance to sanction Austria, Czech Republic, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Sweden
Grey zones Austria, Belgium, Hungary, Latvia, Luxembourg, Portugal, Slovakia
High tolerance for CoI of 
ministers
Austria, Portugal
High complexity of the issues Austria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Sweden
Trends towards politicization Austria, Slovakia
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management of corruption. Higher policy coverage density does also not suggest 
a high quality of the policies adopted. In this case, even better implementation will 
not suffice to tackle CoI effectively.
We further note that in countries with a higher democracy index, there is also less 
acceptance of corruption. Or, vice versa: in countries where the democracy index is 
lower, the acceptance of corruption is also higher. Also, countries with better safeguards 
against corruption have generally higher scores on democracy indices. Therefore, if 
countries want to take the fight against unethical behaviour seriously, an important 
precondition for this is to – simultaneously – maintain or strengthen systems of Good 
Governance. This applies equally to the rule of law. Further, there is a, statistically not 
significant, relationship between the Government Integrity and the unacceptability of 
corruption. This confirms the hypotheses that Good Governance and ‘ethics pay off’.
More rules, higher trust levels?
OECD (2003) argues that citizens have a big part to play in the establishment of effective 
CoI management. The public should know how public institutions use their power and 
resources entrusted to them. Therefore, the conduct of public officials should be open to 
public scrutiny. However, the increasing regulatory activity, institutionalization and 
growing popularity of ethics policies do not necessarily increase the citizen trust in 
public institutions (Rosenson 2006). On the contrary, enhanced attention to these 
policies can lead to eroding citizen trust in the political systems and processes. For 
example, violations of rules and standards can generate public scandals that influence 
public trust. According to Behnke (2005), ‘in spite of the individual rationality of these 
strategies, the collective irrationality lies in the fact that ever more transparency, ever 
higher standards and tighter regulations create ever more violations of ethical rules, more 
scandals and more investigations, thus (. . .) destroying public trust’ (Behnke 2005, 3).
As trust is a manifold issue, we tried to operationalize the term by testing various 
variables, asking for opinions related to trust. It is often thought that countries with 
higher trust levels have less rules in place than countries with lower trust levels. This is 
contradictory to our findings. Indeed, trust is slightly higher, the higher the policy 
coverage density. However, the result is influenced by Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands, the only two countries with high policy coverage density and high trust 
levels. On the other hand, countries like the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and 
Slovenia also have very high policy coverage density but low trust levels. While the 
general trend might slightly suggest otherwise, a closer look at the cases shows that 
most countries with very high policy coverage density suffer from low trust levels.
Summarizing all the data collected on trust, the results of our analysis do not suggest 
a negative effect of higher policy coverage density on trust, but neither a positive effect. 
It can, thus, at least be questioned if the objective of increasing trust by implementing 
more regulation is achieved. Instead, the EU countries have rarely anticipated the 
consequences of stricter and broader revolving door and disclosure policies to admin-
istrative burdens. As trends towards individualization cause states to regulate ever 
more CoI issues (and vice versa) and cover not only the professional life but also the 
personal lives of public officials, we argue that this unclear picture about the relation-
ship between ever more policies on the one hand, and trust levels on the other, cannot 
be interpreted without accounting for the reason why governments start to regulate 
more in the first place: de-standardization.
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Conclusions: particularism and de-standardization – impact on public 
service ethics
Today, most EU countries address the issue of CoI with the use of regulatory 
instruments and – parallel to this – manage CoI in a highly de-standardized and 
individualized context. Parallel to this, the Member States of the EU have no statistics 
and figures about the development of CoI. At the same time, new policy develop-
ments in the field of CoI create ever new ethical challenges and conflicts of interest. 
Overall, existing rules and policies can only be effective if the Member States are 
willing to invest in the implementation, monitoring and enforcement of rules. 
Although the EU Member States place more attention on the implementation gap 
of CoI policies than decades ago, current developments generate ever more admin-
istrative and bureaucratic burdens. While countries invest more in the institutiona-
lization of ethics policies, the expansion of CoI policies also requires ever more 
investments and – parallel to this – creates ever again shortcomings in the imple-
mentation of policies.
The discussion on how to effectively manage, implement and enforce ethics policies 
is not keeping pace with the call for ever wider definitions, more standards and stricter 
rules. For example, the management of the revolving door issues requires a highly 
professional case-by-case assessment by experts who have the necessary skills to carry 
out these tasks. Most administrations are not in the position to carry out professional 
and speedy assessments in each case. Often responsible administrations have very little 
means and incentives in place to rigorously enforce post-employment provisions. 
Moreover, countries tolerate CoI and rarely prohibit former staff or politicians from 
any new job or activity. At the same time, holders of public office are easily subject to 
scandal reporting, even in minor cases of wrongdoing.
The implementation of ethics policies takes place in a de-standardized management 
context with growing acceptance for diversity, best-fit, context, contingency, nomin-
alism, bounded rationality and individualism. In the field of public service ethics, these 
trends have effects on how ethics policies are implemented. Overall, countries have 
become more meritocratic and diverse, but, at the same time, also more polarized, 
producing ever more inequality and individualization that, again, have an impact on 
perceptions of fairness, attribution and justice. Also, politicians abuse ethics policies 
irresponsibly for their personal self-interest, as a form of self-promotion 
(Grandstanding) and as a political weapon against political opponents (Tosi and 
Warmke 2020; Driver 2005; Neuhäuser and Seidel. 2020). Parallel to this, public 
expectations about ethical behaviour have risen. Like this, trends in the field of political 
ethics are as much towards ‘excessively demanding moralism’ (Driver 2005, 137; 
Neuhäuser and Seidel. 2020) whereas trends in international politics are towards 
a growing disrespect for universal values and moral relativism (Lukes 2008). These 
developments can also be seen in the field of ethics: Countries continue to adopt ever 
more laws and rules in the field of public service ethics, but – either – do not 
implement them effectively or are reluctant to enforce them against their politicians. 
In our survey, more than 30% of national responses concluded that one of the biggest 
challenges in fighting conflicts of interest is ‘political reluctance to sanction’ ministers 
and top-officials. One country mentioned a ‘too high tolerance for CoI of ministers’ 
and one country ‘trends towards politization’. These answers reveal a lack of political 
will and/or too high levels of tolerance against flagrant CoI.
18 C. DEMMKE ET AL.
Yet, in the end, we should highlight that more empirical studies and more non- 
ideological deliberations in the field of ethics are badly needed if we are to better 
understand ethical promises, challenges, and limitations. One of these challenges is to 
understand how government and public management policies are changing and how 
this impacts ethics and workplace behaviour (Demmke 2020b). Today, awareness is 
growing that work in the public sphere is much more complex and no longer dominated 
by the principle of rationality, as Weber predicted. In reality, work is more individual, 
value-laden, emotional, pluralistic, political and more unpredictable than ever. Modern 
public officials have also much more individual decision-making discretion than that 
predicted by Weber. However, extending individual discretion may not only support 
patronage and politization. Instead, it generates an entirely new set of ethical (leader-
ship) challenges. Thus, de-standardization and individualization trends should always 
be seen in this context, too. How much neutrality and standardization do we need and 
how much de-standardization, individualization and discretion do we want?
As regards politicians, they need to lead by example. People are right to expect nothing 
less than exemplarity. Therefore, ethical standards should be set at the highest levels.
At the same time, detecting, managing and measuring ethics policies involve some of 
the greatest challenges and difficulties in legal, political, organizational, behavioural and 
administrative sciences. The management of conflicts of interests ‘is like aiming at 
a moving target and requires careful and flexible consideration’ (Kerkhoff and Overeem 
2021, 91). Countries find themselves in a paradox: whereas politicians must be subject to 
tough scrutiny and the highest standards, it is nonetheless unrealistic to expect that legal 
and managerial ambitions solve the ever new emerging CoI issues once and for all 
(Kerkhoff and Overeem 2021, 91). However, our findings show that one solution could 
be to move away from the current trends towards an individualized ‘bad person’ model of 
integrity (that tries to manage and monitor all forms of potential and individual CoI) 
towards a model of institutional integrity. The latter approach requires that countries 
define criteria and indicators for issues and areas that are of institutional and even 
national importance. Take as an example the case of detecting CoI of Presidents, 
Ministers or Mayors in the management of EU funds on the national level. We are 
aware that the notion of conceptualizing institutional integrity merits a proper discussion.
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